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McGoliath v. David: The European Court of Human
Rights Recent "Equality of Arms" Decision
By Monique C. Lillard*
A. Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights has issued a judgment which adds to the
developing law of Article 6, Section 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR or "the Convention") and which sheds light on
Article 10 (freedom of expression) and its interaction with the law of defamation.
Practically, the decision in Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Steel)' is likely to prompt a review of the availability of legal aid for
defendants in civil cases in the United Kingdom ("UK"), and may be a small step
towards balancing the arms in ad terrorem suits brought by large corporations
against private citizens in order to silence public debate.
B. Background
In the mid-1980's, Helen Steel was intermittently employed for a low wage and
David Morris was an unemployed single father.2 They were associated with a
small political group of environmental activists called London Greenpeace (unaf-
filiated with Greenpeace, International).3 In 1986 Steel and Morris helped produce
Professor of Law, University of Idaho. The author wishes to thank: Prof. Florian Hoffman for thought-
ful editorial suggestions; Staffordshire University Law School (U.K.) for resources provided during her
sabbatical year; and Keith Puttick, Principal Lecturer in Law at Staffordshire University Law School for
his generous sharing of a U.K. perspective on this case.
1 Case of Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 68416/01 (15 February 2005), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ ///tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF94893DC49
EF6600CEBD49&key=42244&sessionld=2271639&skin=hudoc-en&attachment= true. This case will be
hereafter referred to as "Steel."
2 Id. at para. 9.
I Id. at para. 10.
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and distribute a six-page leaflet entitled "What's wrong with McDonald's?"" The
leaflet, a rigorous and resonating rant, purported to expose global economic injus-
tice, the evils of beef production and rainforest defoliation, the health problems
with McDonald's food, the cynicism of McDonald's marketing to children, and the
undesirability of McDonald's employment practices. It contained the suggestion
that parents prompt their children's imaginations by telling them the "grim story
about how hamburgers are made," and turn the Ronald McDonald clown into a
bogeyman.5 One of the headings in the leaflet was "In what way are McDonald's
responsible for torture and murder?" 6 Upon reading the text under this heading,
one realizes that the reference is to holding animals in artificial and confined posi-
tions, then slaughtering them.7
A few thousand of the leaflets were distributed. McDonald's reacted with vigor,
hiring seven private investigators from two different firms to infiltrate London
Greenpeace. 8 After determining that London Greenpeace was not an incorporated
body, so that no legal action could be taken directly against it, McDonald's 9 issued
a writ against Steel, Morris and three others,10 alleging libel. Thus began the long-
est trial, either civil or criminal, in English legal history.
It was deemed to be too prolonged and too complicated for a jury, so the matter
was tried to a single judge, Mr. Justice Bell. McDonald's was represented by lead-
ing and junior counsel with experience in defamation law, and by several solicitors
and assistants. Steel and Morris applied for but were denied legal aid because it
was not available for defamation proceedings in the UK.11 They therefore repre-
sented themselves throughout the trial and appeal, although they received help
from barristers and solicitors acting pro bono and on an ad hoc basis. 12 It is estimated
4 Id. at paras. 10 and 11. The applicants protested the trial judge's finding that they assisted in produc-
tion of the leaflet.
5 Td. at para. 12.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 ld. at para. 13.
9 Plaintiffs were McDonald's Corporation (a U.S. company) and McDonald's Restaurants Limited (a UK
company), hereinafter referred to collectively as "McDonald's." Id. at para. 14.
IC McDonald's withdrew proceeding against the three other defendants, in exchange for an apology. Id.
I d. at para. 16.
121d.
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that McDonald's spent over GPB 10 million on trial expenses. Steel and Morris
quickly used up the GPB 40,000 raised by donation for them. After 20,000 pages of
transcripts, 40,000 pages of documentary evidence, 130 witnesses, Judge Bell delib-
erated for six months, then delivered his 762 page judgment in June, 1997, ten years
after the leaflet was distributed by Steel and Morris and seven years after McDon-
ald's had sought the writ.13
Judge Bell found numerous untruths in the leaflet. He was careful in his findings,
as is demonstrated by the following excerpted finding:
The charge that McDonald's food is very unhealthy because it is high in fat, sugar,
animal products and salt (sodium), and low in fibre, vitamins and minerals, and
because eating it more than just occasionally may well make your diet high in fat,
sugar, animal products and salt (sodium), and low in fibre, vitamins and minerals,
with the very real, that is to say serious or substantial risk that you will suffer can-
cer of the breast or bowel or heart disease as a result, and that McDonald's know
this but they do not make it clear, is untrue. However, various of the First and Sec-
ond Plaintiffs' [i.e. McDonald's] advertisements, promotions and booklets have
pretended to a positive nutritional benefit which McDonald's food, high in fat and
saturated fat and animal products and sodium, and at one time low in fibre, did not
match.14
Steel and Morris counterclaimed for defamation arising from a leaflet produced by
McDonald's entitled "Why McDonald's is going to Court," which alleged that Steel
and Morris had published the original leaflet knowing it to be untrue. 15 Judge Bell
found that McDonald's allegation that Steel and Morris had lied was "unjustified,"
but that those unjustified remarks were made with qualified privilege.16 He found
that the privilege was not lost because McDonald's had not acted with malice. 17
Although McDonald's had proven no actual damages, Judge Bell awarded McDon-
ald's GPB 60,000.18
', Id. at para. 26.
14 Id. at para. 27.
11 Id. at para. 28.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 McDonald's did not invoke the English Rule, and did not ask for an order that the applicants pay their
costs. Id. at para. 29.
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An appeal followed, lasting 23 days, which resulted in a 301 page judgment.19 The
Court of Appeal found in applicants' favor on some points, disagreeing with Judge
Bell about the truth of the sting of some of the leaflet's allegations, including the
justification for writing that "if one eats enough McDonald's food, one's diet may
well become high in fat, etc., with the very real risk of heart disease." 20 The Court
of Appeal therefore reduced the damages to GBP 40,000.21 The House of Lords
refused further leave to appeal.22
Steel and Morris then applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
which allowed them to bring two complaints. One, under Article 6, Section 1 of the
Convention, contending that the denial of legal aid rendered the proceedings un-
fair; the other under Article 10, contending that the defamation proceeding and its
outcome interfered disproportionately with applicants' right to freedom of expres-
sion.
C. Unfair Trial - Lack of Counsel
Article 6 Section 1 of the Convention provides: "In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal ..."23 The Convention left Contracting States with a free choice of the
means of ensuring effective civil access to court, and deliberately omitted an obliga-
tion to provide legal aid in civil cases.24
11 Id. at paras. 30-35. That appeal was heard in 1996, before the incorporation of the Convention into UK
Law by the Human Rights Act 1998. If the appeal had been heard after that Act came in to operation (in
October 2000) the UK's Court of Appeal would have been obliged to hear the arguments based on the
Convention articles, and the matter need not have gone to the ECtHR in Strasbourg.
20 Id. at pars. 34.
21 Id. at para. 35.
2 Id. at para. 36.
23 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
14 One alternative available to States is simplifying applicable civil procedure so that the system is more
accessible. Another, used extensively by Judge Bell in the McDonald's case, is for the judge to intervene
frequently during the courtroom proceedings. Case of Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No.
68416/01 (15 February 2005), paras. 57, 60 and 62, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=42244&sessionld =
2271639&skin=hudoc-en&attachment= true.
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In this case, the applicants were refused legal aid because the UK Legal Aid Act of
1988 explicitly provided that defamation proceedings were excepted from the legal
aid scheme.25 That Act was in force throughout the trial and appeal. In assessing
whether this procedure, as applied to Steel and Morris, was in violation of Article
6(1), the European Court of Human Rights recalled that the right of access to a
court is not absolute.26 It does not demand "equality of arms" between both sides,
"as long as each side is afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case
under conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-
vis the adversary." 27 Nor is there a right under the Convention to obtain free legal
aid in civil matters.28
But the ECtHR held that the right of access secured by Article 6(1) does sometimes
require the Convention states to provide legal aid in civil suits and found that the
UK had violated this duty in the present case. The question that arises from this
ruling is when legal aid in civil suits must be provided. Steel does not provide a
satisfactory general answer, even though the ECtHR did determine that applicants
Steel and Morris were deprived of their opportunity to present their case effectively
by the denial of their request for legal aid. 29 Rather than set forth a clear standard,
Steel continues the practice of answering on a case-by-case basis, depending "inter
alia upon the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the
complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the applicant's capacity to repre-
sent him or herself effectively." 30 Clear guidelines are elusive in Steel. Cases like
Steel, decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances or case-by-case factual
21 Legal Aid Act 1988, Schedule 2, Part II, Paragraph 1. Since then legal aid law in England and Wales
has been reformed by the Access to Justice Act 1999. The new act still maintains the presumption that
civil legal aid should not be granted in defamation suits, but does allow for discretionary exceptional
funding for cases involving wide public interest. Defamation suits could be treated favorably, within
that discretion, but have not been.





28 Airey v. Ireland, 2 EHRR 305 (9/10/79)(Mr. O'Donoghue, Dissenting).




30 Id. at para. 61.
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analysis, are notoriously unhelpful for those who yearn to know the rules of law.
While the ECtHR was acting in a supervisory, or review, mode, and as such is not
attempting to take the place of competent national rule-making authorities, 31 people
in Convention states charged with determining eligibility for civil legal aid will find
themselves obliged to attempt to predict outcomes in future similar cases. They
may only draw conclusions from a study of the ECtHR's method of analysis and
the facts it found determinative in Steel.
First the ECtHR studied the character of the underlying civil case. The ECtHR
pointed out that defamation actions are less serious and important than family
rights cases, which affect relations between and among individuals, including chil-
dren.32 But the ECtHR noted that, in the instant case, Steel and Morris were defen-
dants who had not chosen to commence the lawsuit,3 3 but who were faced with
significant damages. 34 Throughout the opinion the ECtHR also acknowledged the
scope and complexity of the proceedings, noting that defamation law is inherently
complicated and nuanced. In this respect, it seems pertinent to the ECtHR's analy-
sis that the factual issues in contention were detailed and technical, touching on
disparate areas of scientific knowledge.
Then the ECtHR assessed the applicants, inquiring into how able they were to pre-
sent their own cases?35 This analysis was made in hindsight, and therefore became
more nearly an inquiry into how well the applicants actually performed, as op-
posed to how well they might have been expected to perform. The ECtHR con-
cluded that Steel and Morris were "articulate and resourceful," forceful and persis-
tent.36 The ECtHR also noted that the applicants had been given some help from
solicitors, and both Judge Bell and the Court of Appeals gave them some latitude
for their inexperience. But the opinion is laden with evidence of how their lack of
legal knowledge and experience hampered and possibly crippled their case. The
ECtHR wrote: "neither the sporadic help given by the volunteer lawyers nor the
extensive judicial assistance and latitude granted to the applicants as litigants in
3' Id. at para. 87.
32 Id. at para. 63.
33 Id. Of course, Steel and Morris could have chosen to apologize and be dismissed, like the three others
who were sued along with them. But to do so would be to give up expressive rights. At this point the
applicant's Article 10 rights link to their Article 6 rights.
14 Td. McDonald's originally pled for damages up to GPB 100,000. The ECtHR compared the pled
amount to the applicant's small or nonexistent incomes.
35 Id. at para. 68.
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person, was any substitute for competent and sustained representation by an ex-
perienced lawyer familiar with the case and with the law of libel."37
The situation of Steel and Morris was contrasted with that of the applicant in the
similar case of McVicar v. the UK. 38 Mr. McVicar, also a citizen of the UK and also a
defendant in a defamation suit, had applied for and been denied legal aid.39 McVi-
car also lost in the underlying lawsuit and had then applied to the ECtHR, asserting
the same grounds: right to fair trial and freedom of expression. He was, however,
unsuccessful. 40 The ECtHR in Steel distinguished McVicar's factual situation re-
garding his Article 6(1) allegation from the circumstances in the Steel case.41 Mr.
McVicar, the ECtHR noted, had been required to prove the truth of only a single,
principal allegation.42 Steel and Morris, on the other hand, were faced with pro-
ceedings of a different scale, given the length of the trial and complexity of the fac-
tual and legal issues.43 The ECtHR also noted that Mr. McVicar was a well-
educated and experienced journalist, and was represented for a significant portion
of the proceedings by a solicitor specializing in defamation law.44 Steel and Morris,
on the other hand, were less well-educated and had less help from lawyers.
The ECtHR's attention to factual detail is interesting, and McVicar is logically dis-
tinguished, but the large questions remain unanswered: will Article 6(1) become a
backdoor means to civil legal aid in Convention states? When, exactly, should
Convention states consider that the Convention requires legal aid to be provided?
While Steel and Morris were defendants in a legal action, therefore not the instiga-
tors of the lawsuit, it is nonetheless possible to characterize them as the instigators
of the events as they "toke on" McDonalds by leafleting and making active protest.
37 1d. at para. 69.





41 Case of Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 68416/01 (15 February 2005), paras. 64 and 67,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ / / / tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF
94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=42244&sessionld=2271639&skin=hudoc-en&attachment= true.
42 Id. at para. 64.
43 ld.
44 Id. at para. 67.
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This was their right, of course, and is a right to be protected. But it is esoteric, a
matter of principle. Other civil actions, whether people are technically plaintiffs or
defendants, involve much more fundamental matters of existence. The ECtHR in
Steel recognized this by implying that family law matters are more deserving of
assurance of fair access and equality of arms than defamation suits. 45 On this rea-
soning, however, shouldn't employment matters also be protected by a grant of
legal aid? After all, where people's livelihood is at stake, the consequences of los-
ing income stream tangibly and quickly affect nearly every aspect of the lives of the
dismissed worker and his or her family and dependents. Furthermore, employ-
ment proceedings can also be factually and legally complex, and often involve a
large, rich, well-represented corporation on one side and an unsophisticated, un-
represented and underfunded individual on the other. On the other hand, it could
be argued that employment, welfare and even family disputes are less deserving of
public funding than defamation suits, given the latter category's potential for chill-
ing important speech rights. By providing nothing more than a factual analysis of
the proceedings below, the ECtHR leaves us pondering the extent and direction of
its decision.
The U.K. Government had argued that the determination that legal aid was "'in-
dispensable for effective access to court"' was reserved for "exceptional circum-
stances." 46 The ECtHR failed to pick up this language, and presented its analysis as
completely factual, stating:
The question whether the provision of legal aid is necessary for a fair hearing must
be determined on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of each case
and will depend inter alia upon the important of what is at stake for the applicant in
the proceedings, the complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the appli-
cant's capacity to represent him or herself effectively.47
This statement in Steel is neither a rule nor a standard, but is merely an open-ended
invitation to test the limits of Article 6(1). Steel's Article 6(1) finding is not limited
to defamation cases, so it is likely to provoke a review of the funding of a variety of
civil suits in public and private law systems, along with a more general examina-
tion of access to the courts.
4, Td. at para. 63 (citing McVicar v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 46311/99 (7 May 2002), para. 61,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkpl197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF
94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=34164&sessionld=2275835&skin=hudoc-en&attachment= true).
46 Id. at para. 55.
47 1d. at para. 61.
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D. Unfair Trial - Other Complaints
The ECtHR declined to use its process as a backdoor appeal of specific substantive
issues. Insofar as the applicants alleged that specific rulings made by the judges
caused unfairness in breach of Article 6, Section 1, the ECtHR considered these
"subsumed within the principal complaint about lack of legal aid."48
E. Free Expression
Article 10, Section 1 of the Convention establishes the right to freedom of expres-
sion, including to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas.
Section 2 restricts these rights, as "necessary in a democratic society," to protect,
inter alia "the reputation or rights of others." 49 Defamation law has long hovered
within the crack between the concepts espoused by these two sections.50  Legal
protections offered by defamation law are an admitted interference with freedom of
expression, but the interference is justified by the legitimate governmental aim of
protecting the reputation and rights of others. The application of Steel and Morris
led the ECtHR into this area of delicate balance.
The ECtHR began its inquiry by focusing on what is "necessary in a democratic
society" and assessing the proportionality of the limitation imposed by defamation
suits upon free expression. It noted the important political concerns expressed in
the leaflet, and quickly rejected the UK government's suggestion that as non-media
defendants these applicants were entitled to less protection than the press. 51 At
several points the ECtHR underlined the important public role of campaigns like
48 Id. at para. 75.
41 Id. at para. 77 (quoting Article 10 of Convention). These restrictions are conceived within a legal and
democratic framework.
50 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Indeed, the arguments made by applicants
are similar to those made by defendants in New York Times. New York Times was asserted by the appli-
cant in McVicar (McVicar v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 46311/99 (7 May 2002), para. 65, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF94893DC49
EF6600CEBD49&key=34164&sessionld=2275835&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true) but was not ad-
dressed by the ECtHR.
5' Case of Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 68416/01 (15 February 2005), paras. 89-90,




that launched by London Greenpeace. 52 The ECtHR found troubling, however, that
the leaflet made serious allegations presented as statements of fact rather than
value judgments.
It rejected applicants' arguments that McDonald's, as a large multinational com-
pany, should be unable to sue for defamation. The ECtHR reasoned that even large
companies should be allowed "to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of alle-
gations which risk harming its reputation."53 But the crux of the ECtHR's holding54
was that, if a State does provide defamation remedies to corporate bodies, "it is
essential, in order to safeguard the countervailing interests in free express and open
debate, that a measure of procedural fairness and equality of arms is provided
for." 55 The ECtHR recognized that an inequality of arms can be especially devastat-
ing to defendants in defamation cases, because they bear the burden of proving
truth, a burden that the ECtHR was unwilling to declare incompatible with Article
10.56
The ECtHR focused particularly on the size of the damage award, which the Con-
vention requires to bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury
suffered. 57 The ECtHR's reasoning is not particularly clear here. The ECtHR was
troubled that McDonald's received presumed damages, that is, that McDonald's
did not have to prove that they had in fact suffered any financial loss.58 The ECtHR
also noted the disproportionality between the amount of damages and the incomes
of Steel and Morris.59 The ECtHR does not indicate which of these facts was deter-
minative in concluding that applicants' Article 10 rights had been abrogated in the
English lawsuit. The fact that McDonald's had done nothing, to date, to enforce the
52 ld.
53 Id. at para. 94.
54 Td. at para. 98. The ECtHR rejected, summarily, the applicants' objection to the placement of the bur-
den of proof on truth should not be on the defendant. It refused to disturb factual findings by the UK
courts regarding applicants' role in production of the leaflet and the relevance of similar leaflets earlier
by other organizations.
5, Id. at para. 95.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 96 (citing Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the UK, 316-B Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at para. 49 (1995)).
58 Id. at paras. 95-97.
59 Id.
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damages was not important, as the judgment against Steel and Morris remains
pending and enforceable against them.60
This decision in Steel was in line with ECtHR precedent, notably Thorgeir Thorgeir-
son v. Iceland6' and Hertel v. Switzerland.62 Thorgeirson established the importance of
freedom of expression for controversial issues not purely political, but involving
matters about which there was strong interest in open public debate; the matter at
issue was police mistreatment of citizens. Hertel was factually more like Steel, at it
involved the expression of off-beat, non-mainstream views of science and health.
Mr. Hertel wrote a research paper detailing a study he had done on the human
effects of the consumption of food prepared in microwave ovens.63 He sent that
paper to the Journal Franz Weber which expanded on the findings, enlivened the
writing, and added illustrations of the Grim Reaper peering out of and pointing to
microwave ovens. 64 The Swiss Association of Manufacturers and Suppliers of
Household Electrical Appliances was quick to sue under Swiss unfair competition
law, winning an injunction against, among others, Mr. Hertel.65 Mr. Hertel was
prohibited from making certain specified statements about microwave ovens.66
After determining that the injunction, an obvious infringement of speech, was "pre-
scribed by law" and motivated by "legitimate aim," the ECtHR determined that the
injunction was not "necessary in a democratic society" to achieve those aims.67
That last inquiry required mainly an assessment of proportionality. In order to
protect the manufacturers' commercial interests, the Swiss courts had curtailed
applicant's right to utter statements "related to the very substance of his views"
and had "partly censored his work." 68 This went beyond what was "necessary." 69
60 Id. at para. 95 (citing Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88 (25 June 1992), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Thorgeirs
on&sessionid=2282851&skin=hudoc-en).
6' Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88 (25 June 1992), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=l&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Thorgeirs
on&sessionid=2282851&skin=hudoc-en).






6,6 Id. at para. 20. The injunction was limited and specific about what could not be said.
67r ld.




Under Article 41 of the Convention, the ECtHR awarded no pecuniary damage to
Steel and Morris, because they had not incurred actual costs for their own lawyers,
nor was there proof that they had lost earnings as a result of the preparation of
their own defense.70 However, Steel and Morris were awarded non-pecuniary
damages of EUR 20,000 and 15,000, respectively, for stress, anxiety, stress-related
physical illness and Mr. Morris' lost time with his young son.7' The ECtHR was
careful to separate the natural stress suffered by litigants to any lawsuit from the
extra anxiety felt by Steel and Morris because they had to defend themselves. 72
Steel and Morris did have counsel and solicitors for the ECtHR hearing; some of
those expenses (EUR 50,000) were awarded. 73
G. Ad terrorem Suits
The ECtHR did not comment on or make any reference to McDonald's motivation
for bringing the suit. The absence of pecuniary loss, McDonald's willingness to
drop the matter for an apology, and McDonald's admitted lack of desire to enforce
the judgment show that McDonald's was not in the suit for the money. Nor is it
likely that McDonald's was hurt, in any sense, by the distribution of a few thousand
leaflets. Ironically, by bringing this suit, McDonald's has broadcast the assertions
in the leaflet far beyond the streets of London. Even if it is assumed that a corpora-
tion can have such emotions as pride, humiliation, or satisfaction from an abstract
victory, it is an astounding business decision to invest GBP 10 million on lawyers,
plus the cost of three years of private detectives, just as a balm to an infinitesimally
damaged reputation.
6 Id. at para. 51.
71 Case of Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 68416/01 (15 February 2005), paras. 100-112,
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But it would be a savvy business decision to try to nip such leafleting and criticism
in the bud. The leaflet contained a fair amount of accurate information along with
its stinging value judgments. Certainly McDonald's won in both the trial court and
the Court of Appeal, so its case was not without merit. Nonetheless, the main pur-
pose of the suit may well have been to chill and stifle potential future critics. This
case demonstrates that even indigents, and therefore certainly people with any
economic assets, are intimidated and even terrorized by the prospect of a large civil
judgment - hence the appellation ad terrorem suits. 74 McGoliath may well have
been attempting to gag not only David Morris and Helen Steel, but also potential
future Davids who were crafting their slingshots.
It is hard to define an ad terrorem suit, and even harder to formulate legal rules to
stop such legal actions; motivation is usually irrelevant if one stands on firm legal
ground. Perhaps it is just as well that the ECtHR proceeding stayed away from the
accusatory label.75 By avoiding the focus on McDonald's motivation, the ECtHR
allowed its decision to have even broader effect. As it stands, the ECtHR decision,
despite its vague parameters, is a victory for the less powerful parties to important
civil suits throughout the states parties of the Convention.
74 McDonald's case was not meritless, but otherwise would meet the standard definition of a Strategic
Lawsuit Against Pubic Participation or "SLAPP." Defamation is one of the favorite tools of SLAPPers.
See D. Mark Jackson, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPs: Revisiting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 9 WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL 491 (2001). California and other American states
have successfully attempted to prevent SLAPP suits. See, e.g, Cal. Code Div. Pro. Section 425.16. See,
generally,Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti-SLAPP Motions to Strike
or Dismiss 22 COA2d 317 (Oct. 2004).
7' In fact, the ECtHR correctly defended McDonald's ability to sue. "[T]he fact that the plaintiff ... was
a large multinational company should [not] in principle deprive it of a right to defend itself against
defamatory allegations ... [There is an] interest in protecting the commercial success and viability of
companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, [and] for the wider economic good." Case of
Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 68416/01 (15 February 2005), para. 94, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF94893DC49
EF6600CEBD49&key=42244&sessionld=2271639&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
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